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Pete Finnigan's Oracle Security Weblog

This is the weblog for Pete Finnigan. Pete works in the area of Oracle security and he specialises in auditing Oracle databases for security issues. This weblog is aimed squarely at those interested in the security of their Oracle databases.

ACCESSIBLE BY Clause in PL/SQL

Over many years I have advocated using security in PL/SQL that checks that a caller is coming from the right place. For many years we have been able to do this with the call stack and test on our PL/SQL code whether the caller is coming from the right place or not.

Oracle added in 12c the ACCESSIBLE BY clause that added a similar idea to the PL/SQL language. So we can define a piece of PL/SQL and limit where that piece of PL/SQL can be called from with the ACCESSIBLE BY clause. This is a great feature BUT my method still has some advantages as we have more control by using the call stack in our own code so we can even check the line number we are calling from. This is good as it can help enforce that the caller has not been modified as the check is in the callee.

The main advantage of ACCESSIBLE BY though is that it is baked into the PL/SQL as part of the language whereas my method is code in user space.

There are advantages for each method.

The earlier versions of this syntax were limited to the object level but we can now add these clauses for individual procedures and functions in a package now.

There is no dictionary data for what has been set as far as I can tell. So if we need to analyse the PL/SQL in a database for use of the ACCESSIBLE BY clause then we need to parse the PL/SQL source code and extract the use of this syntax. I have created a simple script that does this and its use is here in 23c:

SQL> @sc_access
Owner Name Type Sub-Object Line Accessible List
================== ======================= ================== ================== ======== =================================================
SYS CDBVIEW_INTERNAL PACKAGE . 2 PACKAGE SYS.CDBVIEW
SYS DBMS_SQLTUNE_UTIL0 PACKAGE CHECK_DV_ACCESS 431 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_SQLTUNE
SYS DBMS_SQLTUNE_UTIL1 PACKAGE GET_SEQ_REMOTE 697 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_SQLTUNE_INTERNAL
SYS DBMS_RULE_INTERNAL PACKAGE I_EVALUATE 46 PACKAGE DBMS_CHAIN_INVOKER
SYS DBMS_PLUGTS PACKAGE GETDEBUGENABLE 121 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_PLUGTSP
SYS DBMS_PLUGTS PACKAGE KCP_SETPIRENA 529 PACKAGE SYS.KUPW$WORKER
SYS DBMS_TTS PACKAGE PUT_PROTECTED_TSE_KEY 289 PACKAGE SYS.KUPW$WORKER
SYS DBMS_TTS PACKAGE GET_AFN_DBID 310 PACKAGE SYS.KUPW$WORKER
SYS DBMS_TTS PACKAGE GET_AFN_DBIDXENDIAN 331 PACKAGE SYS.KUPW$WORKER
SYS DBMS_TTS PACKAGE CONVERTENCRYPTEDDATAFILECOPY 386 PACKAGE SYS.KUPW$WORKER
SYS UTL_XML PACKAGE PARSEEXPR 129 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA
SYS UTL_XML PACKAGE PARSEQUERY 143 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA
SYS UTL_XML PACKAGE XMLPARSE 206 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA_INT
SYS UTL_XML PACKAGE ISNAMEOMF 293 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA_UTIL
SYS UTL_XML PACKAGE SSCPARSE 382 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA_INT
GSMADMIN_INTERNAL DBMS_GSM_DBADMIN PACKAGE GETSHARDINGMETHOD 72 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_GSM_FIXED
SYS DBMS_METADATA_INT PACKAGE ADD_TRANSFORM 298 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA
SYS DBMS_METADATA_UTIL PACKAGE SET_MARKER 818 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_METADATA_INT
SYS DBMS_UPG_JSON0 PACKAGE . 2 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_UPG_JSON
SYS DBMS_UPG_JSON_INT PACKAGE . 2 PACKAGE SYS.DBMS_UPG_JSON, SYS.DBMS_SODA
CTXSYS DRIACCHELP PACKAGE . 2 PACKAGE DRIACC
CTXSYS DRIOPT PACKAGE GET_P_INV_COUNT 10 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVDDL
CTXSYS DRIOPT PACKAGE SET_P_INV_COUNT 14 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVDDL
CTXSYS DRIOPT PACKAGE RESET_AGGMERGE_HANDLE 215 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVDML
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE SETUPXMLSEARCHPREFS 1103 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIXMD
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_INDEX 1445 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_PARTITION 1466 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_OBJECT 1473 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_VALUE 1479 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_SUB_VALUE 1488 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_PENDING 1494 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_CDICOL 1507 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_IDX_DICTIONARY 1513 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_USER_EXTRACT_RULE 1526 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE INSERT_USER_EXTRACT_TYPE 1534 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIIMP
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE VALIDATE_ATTR 1549 PACKAGE DRIVAL, PROCEDURE VALIDATE_ATTR
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE GETOBJECTATTID 1566 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRIXMD
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE SECONDARYINDEXEXISTS 1574 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVXTAB
CTXSYS DRIXMD PACKAGE GETWALLETPATH 1599 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVDML
CTXSYS DRITHSC PACKAGE SET_PV_LAST_ID 368 PACKAGE CTX_THES
CTXSYS DRIUTL PACKAGE PARSE_OBJECT_NAME 38 PACKAGE DRVUTL, PROCEDURE PARSE_OBJECT_NAME
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_PV_IDX_MEM 937 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_PV_IDX_MEM 942 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS, TYPE XPATHINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_PV_IDX_SYNC_TYPE 946 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_PV_IDX_SYNC_TYPE 951 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS, TYPE XPATHINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_PV_IS_IMPORT 955 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS, TYPE XPATHINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_PV_IS_IMPORT 960 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS, TYPE XPATHINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_PV_MASTER_PARAMS 964 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_PV_MASTER_PARAMS 969 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, TYPE RULEINDEXMETHODS, TYPE XPATHINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_PV_PARTITION_POPULATE 973 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS, CTXSYS.DRIPARSE
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_PV_PARTITION_POPULATE 978 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_PV_TABLESPACE 982 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_PV_TABLESPACE 987 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE GET_OPT_REBUILD_ERROR_TEXT_COUNT 991 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVXMD
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_OPT_REBUILD_ERROR_TEXT 997 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVXMD
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE SET_OPT_REBUILD_ERROR_TYPE 1003 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVXMD
CTXSYS DRVDDL PACKAGE REMOVESEARCHON 1011 TYPE TEXTINDEXMETHODS
CTXSYS DRVODM PACKAGE SVM_TRAIN 59 PACKAGE CTXSYS.CTX_CLS
CTXSYS DRVXMD PACKAGE INDEXHASPATHHASHINDEX 439 PACKAGE CTXSYS.DRVXTAB
SYS WWV_DBMS_SQL_APEX_220200 PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE APEX_220200.WWV_FLOW_CODE_EXEC_MLE,PACKAGE APEX_220200.WWV_FLOW_DYNAMIC_EXEC,PACKAGE APEX_220200.WWV_FLOW_SESSION_RAS
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_CODE_EXEC_MLE PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_CODE_EXEC
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_CODE_EXEC_PLSQL PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_CODE_EXEC
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_APP_INSTALL_INT PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_IMP_PARSER
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_REGION_LIST PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_REGION_NATIVE
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_ZIP_INT PACKAGE . 1 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_ZIP
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_ADVISOR_CHECKS_I PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_ADVISOR_CHECKS_API
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_SPATIAL_INT PACKAGE . 3 PACKAGE WWV_FLOW_SPATIAL_API

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

This shows the lines of code that have ACCESSIBLE BY and also the object name, owner and procedure or function if it's a package. It also shows the line number for the ACCESSIBLE BY clause and also the allowed caller list.

There are some limits to this script and its naive at this stage. I extract the package procedure and function names from the source and match to the line number of the ACCESSIBLE BY clause. There are probably some bugs in it and it doesn't handle the case of wrapped code should the package header be wrapped. It has also only been tested on the default 23c Free install. But its a useful start point to see what PL/SQL code already uses this clause. it doesn't handle perfectly the case where the ACCESSIBLE BY is on the same line as the PROCEDURE or FUNCTION and also doesn't handle multi line cases.

Its a simple script and here it is:

-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- WWW.PETEFINNIGAN.COM LIMITED
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Script Name : sc_access.sql
-- Author : Pete Finnigan
-- Date : December 2023
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Description : This script checks for ACCESSIBKLE BHY clauses
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Maintainer : Pete Finnigan (http://www.petefinnigan.com)
-- Copyright : Copyright (C) 2023 PeteFinnigan.com Limited. All rights
-- reserved. All registered trademarks are the property of their
-- respective owners and are hereby acknowledged.
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- License : This software is licensed to you by PeteFinnigan.com Limited. All
-- rights and ownership and copyright in the software are retained by
-- PeteFinnigan.com Limited in all possible cases. Posession of this
-- software does not infer any additonal rights. If you receive this
-- software without these copyright notices and license text, this text,
-- license and copyright still applies. This text, copyright and license
-- must not be removed under any circumstances. This applies to all
-- text displayed as comments up until and including the version history,
-- This text also applies to any copyright, banner or other text
-- refering to PeteFinnigan.com Limited ownership that is output by
-- the program.
--
-- This software is free to use BUT it is NOT open source and NOT GPL
-- or any similar license and it is NOT in the public domain.
--
-- You are permitted to use this software commercially or privately
-- provided these notices or banners as described are not removed. You
-- may modify the software and use it internally but this does not
-- infer any additonal rights in the software. i.e. if you delete
-- some of our code or change variable names or add features that does
-- not make it your code and does not give you the right to remove
-- our ownership in this software shown in these notices. This software must
-- not be made available or published in anyway, any language, any
-- modified form or original form except by PeteFinnigan.com Limited.
-- You must not incorporate this software into any free or commercial
-- product or software and you must not sell or give away any software that
-- includes this sofware.
--
--
-- In short this text is not written by a lawyer so please respect the
-- intent that you can use or modify it freely but not give it away
-- yourself or take away our right to attribution.
-- If someone else needs a copy please ask them to come to PeteFinnigan.com
-- Limited and we will happily let them also have a free copy. Also
-- as you may expect freely use does not include adding this software to
-- a commercial or free product (without our permission) but you
-- can use it internally in projects. We put our time into the free scripts
-- on our website or training courses and give these tools away for free and
-- in return we expect our copyright and ownership to always remain.
-- We like to help people but we also want to benefit from the fact
-- our name becomes known through these scripts and tools and software
-- that we make. We hope this makes sense.
--
--
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Version History
-- ===============
--
-- Who version Date Description
-- === ======= ====== ======================
-- P.Finnigan 1.0 Dec 2023 First Issue.
-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

set serveroutput on
set lines 500

declare
--
lv_t varchar2(4000);
--
cursor c_main is
select o.owner,
o.name,
o.type,
o.line,
substr(o.text,instr(o.text,'(',1)+1,((instr(o.text,')',-1))-instr(o.text,'(',1))-1) text
from (
select i.owner,
i.name,
i.type,
i.line,
upper(i.text) text
from dba_source i
where upper(i.text) like '%ACCESSIBLE%BY%(%)%'
and i.text not like '%--%') o;
--
function getsub(pv_owner in varchar2,
pv_name in varchar2,
pv_type in varchar2,
pv_line in number) return varchar2
is
cursor c_code (cv_owner in varchar2,
cv_name in varchar2,
cv_type in varchar2) is
select c.text,
c.line
from dba_source c
where c.owner=cv_owner
and c.name=cv_name
and c.type=cv_type
and (upper(c.text) like '%PROCEDURE%' or upper(c.text) like '%FUNCTION%')
and upper(c.text) not like '%--%';
--
lv_text varchar2(4000);
--
begin
--
for lv_code in c_code(pv_owner,pv_name,pv_type) loop
if(lv_code.line>pv_line) then
exit;
end if;
lv_text:=lv_code.text;
end loop;
--
return(lv_text);
--
end;
--
function extract(pv_text in varchar2) return varchar2
is
lv_ret varchar2(4000);
begin
if(instr(upper(pv_text),'PROCEDURE',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=replace(replace(ltrim(substr(upper(pv_text),instr(upper(pv_text),'PROCEDURE',1)+9)),chr(10)),chr(13));
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),'(',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),'(',1)-1);
end if;
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),' ',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),' ',1)-1);
end if;
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),')',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),')',1)-1);
end if;
--
elsif(instr(upper(pv_text),'FUNCTION',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=replace(replace(ltrim(substr(upper(pv_text),instr(upper(pv_text),'FUNCTION',1)+8)),chr(10)),chr(13));
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),'(',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),'(',1)-1);
end if;
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),' ',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),' ',1)-1);
end if;
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),'RETURN',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),'RETURN',1));
end if;
if(instr(upper(lv_ret),')',1)>0) then
lv_ret:=substr(upper(lv_ret),1,instr(upper(lv_ret),')',1)-1);
end if;
else
lv_ret:='';
end if;
return(lv_ret);
end;
--
begin
--
dbms_output.put_line(rpad('Owner',20,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('Name',25,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('Type',20,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('Sub-Object',35,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('Line',10,' ')||chr(9)||
'Accessible List');
dbms_output.put_line(rpad('==================',20,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('=======================',25,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('==================',20,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('==================',35,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad('========',10,' ')||chr(9)||
'=================================================');
for lv_main in c_main loop
--
lv_t:=extract(getsub(lv_main.owner,lv_main.name,lv_main.type,lv_main.line));
if(lv_t is null) then
lv_t:='.';
end if;

dbms_output.put_line(rpad(lv_main.owner,20,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad(lv_main.name,25,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad(lv_main.type,20,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad(lv_t,35,' ')||chr(9)||
rpad(lv_main.line,10,' ')||chr(9)||
lv_main.text);
--
end loop;
--
end;
/

We implement the same checks in our PL/SQL security code scanner differently as it has a proper PL/SQL parser for evaluating PL/SQL code for issues. I may spend some more time on this above script to iron out the edge cases and I will post here again when thats done.

#oracleace #sym_42 #oracle #database #security #plsql #securecode

Oracle Permissions and Statements or Actions

If you look at the permissions in the database that are possible for a PL/SQL procedure then it looks, at first site to be a little odd. Lets see the possible permissions for PL/SQL (Procedure)

SQL> select * from system_privilege_map where name like '%PROCEDURE%';

PRIVILEGE NAME PROPERTY
---------- ---------------------------------------- ----------
-140 CREATE PROCEDURE 0
-141 CREATE ANY PROCEDURE 0
-142 ALTER ANY PROCEDURE 0
-143 DROP ANY PROCEDURE 0
-144 EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE 0
-241 DEBUG ANY PROCEDURE 0

6 rows selected.

SQL>

If we just show those that are not %ANY% then:

SQL> select * from system_privilege_map where name like '%PROCEDURE%' and name not like '%ANY%';

PRIVILEGE NAME PROPERTY
---------- ---------------------------------------- ----------
-140 CREATE PROCEDURE 0

SQL>

There is only one permission for PL/SQL and that is CREATE PROCEDURE. Why is there not ALTER PROCEDURE or DROP PROCEDURE or EXECUTE PROCEDURE or DEBUG PROCEDURE?

There are %ANY% versions of these so that a user granted the ANY can operate DDL on another users PL/SQL except SYS because of O7_dictionary_accessibility or the new 23c dictionary protection if its 23c.

So, if we create a user and grant CREATE PROCEDURE that user can of course create a procedure. So lets do that, note we must also grant CREATE SESSION:

C:\>sqlplus sys/oracle@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1 as sysdba

SQL*Plus: Release 11.2.0.4.0 Production on Thu Dec 28 09:13:35 2023

Copyright (c) 1982, 2013, Oracle. All rights reserved.


Connected to:
Oracle Database 23c Free, Release 23.0.0.0.0 - Developer-Release

SQL> create user plsql identified by plsql;

User created.

SQL> grant create procedure to plsql;

Grant succeeded.

SQL> grant create session to plsql;

Grant succeeded.

SQL>

Now create that procedure:

SQL> connect plsql/plsql@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1
Connected.
SQL> create procedure test is begin null; end;
2 /

Procedure created.

SQL>

OK, we have a PL/SQL procedure and only CREATE PROCEDURE but we can do other actions such as ALTER or DROP. Lets show ALTER PROCEDURE:

SQL> sho user
USER is "PLSQL"
SQL> alter procedure test compile;

Procedure altered.

SQL>

This is because of the OBJECT OWNER PRINCIPAL.

If an Oracle user has an object then it can do ACTIONS on that object without specific database permissions. This is the OBJECT OWNER PRINCIPAL.

We see something similar in database auditing. We we can for instance in standard auditing audit a permission such as ALTER USER but it will not catch a user change his password where we must audit the ACTION/STATEMENT USER instead and this catches a user changing their own password with ALTER USER but it doesn't audit ALTER USER when its changing someone else's password with ALTER USER. This is the difference between a privilege and a statement. i.e. we can issue CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE... when we have CREATE ANY PROCEDURE (a privilege) and create a PL/SQL procedure in another schema then we use a privilege BUT if we have a PL/SQL procedure as the owner we can still do CREATE OF REPLACE PROCEDURE... and in this case its a statement.

Confusing!

One final example; if we revoke CREATE PROCEDURE from the user PLSQL can we still ALTER or DROP it?

SQL> connect sys/oracle@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1 as sysdba
Connected.
SQL> revoke create procedure from plsql;

Revoke succeeded.

SQL>
SQL> connect plsql/plsql@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1
Connected.
SQL> alter procedure test compile;

Procedure altered.

SQL> drop procedure test;

Procedure dropped.

SQL>

Interesting; We only need CREATE PROCEDURE to create a procedure and afterwards even if we no longer have CREATE PROCEDURE we can still issue, compile, alter, drop, debug against our own objects.

This is the OBJECT OWNER PRINCIPAL and also the difference between a privilege and a statement.

So after installation of an application we no longer need the CREATE privileges BUT we could not stop an attacker from dropping, altering,. re-creating, compiling and debugging the schema objects as the schema. We could use Database Vault or simple DDL triggers to prevent this

#oracleace #sym_42 #oracle #database #security #plsql #permissions #grants

Cracking APEX Passwords

As part of any security audit we want to test the security or strength of passwords as well as any password management settings. We test database passwords of course with PL/SQL crackers and also C based crackers. We test RAS passwords where they exist and also HTTPD passwords,

A high percentage of databases include an APEX installation so we also want to test APEX passwords. The passwords are stored in the WWV_FLOW_FND_USER table in the WEB_PASSWORD2 column.

It is interesting to note that if someone updated a password directly with SQL then it would be in the WEB_PASSWORD column and be clear text. As part of an audit we want to make sure that there are no clear text passwords.

First log into the database:

C:\>sqlplus scanner/scanner@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1

SQL*Plus: Release 11.2.0.4.0 Production on Fri Dec 22 11:30:42 2023

Copyright (c) 1982, 2013, Oracle. All rights reserved.


Connected to:
Oracle Database 23c Free, Release 23.0.0.0.0 - Developer-Release

SQL>

Print out the WWV_FLOW_FND_USER table:

SQL> set lines 220
SQL> set serveroutput on
SQL> @sc_print 'select * from apex_220200.wwv_flow_fnd_user'
old 32: lv_str:=translate('&&1','''','''''');
new 32: lv_str:=translate('select * from apex_220200.wwv_flow_fnd_user','''','''''');
Executing Query [select * from apex_220200.wwv_flow_fnd_user]
USER_ID : 3800883939144175
SECURITY_GROUP_ID : 10
USER_NAME : ADMIN
FIRST_NAME :
LAST_NAME :
CREATION_DATE : 03-APR-23
CREATED_BY : SYS
LAST_UPDATE_DATE : 15-DEC-23
LAST_UPDATED_BY : ADMIN
START_DATE : 03-APR-23
END_DATE : 29-MAR-43
PERSON_TYPE :
EMAIL_ADDRESS :
WEB_PASSWORD2 : 44A592AEEFFE5DCF40239F21D77838EDABC26EF81F6D558018FA4CD13B1AF45D94911E5BBBB4BD5734CE2B966FDFBA5802DD819EF12AD3B71411FF98772FF4F9
WEB_PASSWORD_VERSION : 5;5;10000
LAST_LOGIN : 15-DEC-23
BUILDER_LOGIN_COUNT : 4
LAST_AGENT : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/120.0.0.0
LAST_IP : 192.168.56.1
ACCOUNT_LOCKED : N
ACCOUNT_EXPIRY : 03-APR-23
FAILED_ACCESS_ATTEMPTS : 0
LAST_FAILED_LOGIN :
FIRST_PASSWORD_USE_OCCURRED : Y
CHANGE_PASSWORD_ON_FIRST_USE : N
ALLOW_APP_BUILDING_YN : N
ALLOW_SQL_WORKSHOP_YN : N
ALLOW_TEAM_DEVELOPMENT_YN : N
DEFAULT_SCHEMA :
ALLOW_ACCESS_TO_SCHEMAS :
DESCRIPTION :
WEB_PASSWORD :
WEB_PASSWORD_RAW :
PASSWORD_DATE :
PASSWORD_ACCESSES_LEFT :
PASSWORD_LIFESPAN_ACCESSES :
PASSWORD_LIFESPAN_DAYS :
DEFAULT_DATE_FORMAT :
KNOWN_AS :
EMPLOYEE_ID :
PERSON_ID :
PROFILE_IMAGE :
PROFILE_IMAGE_NAME :
PROFILE_MIMETYPE :
PROFILE_FILENAME :
PROFILE_LAST_UPDATE :
PROFILE_CHARSET :
ATTRIBUTE_01 :
ATTRIBUTE_02 :
ATTRIBUTE_03 :
ATTRIBUTE_04 :
ATTRIBUTE_05 :
ATTRIBUTE_06 :
ATTRIBUTE_07 :
ATTRIBUTE_08 :
ATTRIBUTE_09 :
ATTRIBUTE_10 :
-------------------------------------------
USER_ID : 7407615931466835
SECURITY_GROUP_ID : 100001
USER_NAME : CUSTADMIN
FIRST_NAME : Pete
LAST_NAME : Finnigan
CREATION_DATE : 15-DEC-23
CREATED_BY : ADMIN
LAST_UPDATE_DATE : 15-DEC-23
LAST_UPDATED_BY : CUSTADMIN
START_DATE : 15-DEC-23
END_DATE : 10-DEC-43
PERSON_TYPE :
EMAIL_ADDRESS : pete@petefinnigan.com
WEB_PASSWORD2 : 1894A011E2E1F02902A55551191C7058015C85A63F00D683D236367CDFF50F326EE6981B2B8E463068DABCEBC8D1CD67E3B115F1A3DC6626ECEEC7C0E3979E72
WEB_PASSWORD_VERSION : 5;5;10000
LAST_LOGIN : 15-DEC-23
BUILDER_LOGIN_COUNT : 3
LAST_AGENT : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/120.0.0.0
LAST_IP : 192.168.56.1
ACCOUNT_LOCKED :
ACCOUNT_EXPIRY : 15-DEC-23
FAILED_ACCESS_ATTEMPTS : 0
LAST_FAILED_LOGIN :
FIRST_PASSWORD_USE_OCCURRED : Y
CHANGE_PASSWORD_ON_FIRST_USE : Y
ALLOW_APP_BUILDING_YN :
ALLOW_SQL_WORKSHOP_YN :
ALLOW_TEAM_DEVELOPMENT_YN :
DEFAULT_SCHEMA : CUSTOMER
ALLOW_ACCESS_TO_SCHEMAS :
DESCRIPTION :
WEB_PASSWORD :
WEB_PASSWORD_RAW :
PASSWORD_DATE :
PASSWORD_ACCESSES_LEFT :
PASSWORD_LIFESPAN_ACCESSES :
PASSWORD_LIFESPAN_DAYS :
DEFAULT_DATE_FORMAT :
KNOWN_AS : Pete
EMPLOYEE_ID :
PERSON_ID :
PROFILE_IMAGE :
PROFILE_IMAGE_NAME :
PROFILE_MIMETYPE :
PROFILE_FILENAME :
PROFILE_LAST_UPDATE :
PROFILE_CHARSET :
ATTRIBUTE_01 :
ATTRIBUTE_02 :
ATTRIBUTE_03 :
ATTRIBUTE_04 :
ATTRIBUTE_05 :
ATTRIBUTE_06 :
ATTRIBUTE_07 :
ATTRIBUTE_08 :
ATTRIBUTE_09 :
ATTRIBUTE_10 :
-------------------------------------------

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

As you can see we have two users and each has a password hash in the WEB_PASSWORD2 column. In the database there has been a number of algorithms used over the years from a custom DES used as a hash from Oracle 6, The SHA1 algorithm from 11.1 and the PDKDF2 and SHA2 from 12.1.0.2.

Apex in current versions also uses PBKDF2 for default authentication and uses a SALT of the security group, username, userID and also specifies the number of iterations of the algorithm. In Apex its possible to change the algorithm and hash function and also number of iterations via instance parameters and of course its possible to create custom authentication schemes. So to check passwords usefully in APEX we can only check the standard hashed ones. This is fine. We can use the WEB_PASSWORD_VERSION to check which passwords are standard or not.

The salt values are stored also in the table so are easy to use. To crack or check the passwords we can use a built in Apex API WWV_FLOW_CRYPTO.HASH_PASSWORD() to test this. So we can try and crack the ADMIN and CUSTADMIN users passwords but first lets get the values we need from the WWV_FLOW_FND_USER table:

SQL> select trim(to_char(user_id,'99999999999999999999')),security_group_id,user_name,web_password_version,web_password2 from apex_220200.wwv_flow_fnd_user;

TRIM(TO_CHAR(USER_ID, SECURITY_GROUP_ID USER_NAME WEB_PASSWORD_VERSION
--------------------- ----------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------
WEB_PASSWORD2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3800883939144175 10 ADMIN 5;5;10000
44A592AEEFFE5DCF40239F21D77838EDABC26EF81F6D558018FA4CD13B1AF45D94911E5BBBB4BD5734CE2B966FDFBA5802DD819EF12AD3B71411FF98772FF4F9

7407615931466835 100001 CUSTADMIN 5;5;10000
1894A011E2E1F02902A55551191C7058015C85A63F00D683D236367CDFF50F326EE6981B2B8E463068DABCEBC8D1CD67E3B115F1A3DC6626ECEEC7C0E3979E72


SQL>

Now we can test the password and see if its correct or not for the ADMIN user:

C:\>sqlplus sys/oracle@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1 as sysdba

SQL*Plus: Release 11.2.0.4.0 Production on Fri Dec 22 12:31:37 2023

Copyright (c) 1982, 2013, Oracle. All rights reserved.


Connected to:
Oracle Database 23c Free, Release 23.0.0.0.0 - Developer-Release

SQL> set serveroutput on
SQL> get sc_apx_p.sql
1 begin
2 dbms_output.put_line(apex_220200.wwv_flow_crypto.hash_password('oracle','5;5;10000',10,'ADMIN',3800883939144175));
3* end;
SQL> /
44A592AEEFFE5DCF40239F21D77838EDABC26EF81F6D558018FA4CD13B1AF45D94911E5BBBB4BD57
34CE2B966FDFBA5802DD819EF12AD3B71411FF98772FF4F9

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

We need to run this as SYS or SYSTEM or a user with the APEX_ADIMISTRATOR_ROLE so I simply logged in as SYS as my user SCANNER doesn't have the APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE. The password was cracked BUT I knew the password was oracle in advance of course so I could simply test it. I could create a loop and try lots of passwords starting with "A" then "B" and so on or use common passwords from a dictionary.

There are a few comments:

  • The algorithm is very slow as that was the idea behind PBKDF2 to make it hard to crack passwords by needing a lot of work to be done; thats why it does 10,000 iterations. We cannot realistically test a lot of potential passwords with PL/SQL.

  • As an auditor I do not want the user used for the audit to be granted APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE. I prefer to have just CREATE SESSION, SELECT ANY DICTIONARY, SELECT ANY TABLE and access to SYS.USER$ and execute on DBMS_CRYPTO

  • As an auditor I do not want to execute any API such as WWV_FLOW_CRYPTO.HASH_PASSWORD as I cannot be certain without a lot of checking and testing that it does not change anything and then I would need to convince the customer

  • A C based solution would be better but in PL/SQL we need an anonymous block that does not call any APIs except DBMS_CRYPTO


I have created a simple PL/SQL framework as an anonymous block with its own PBKDF2 function. It gets the salt details and runs the algorithm and checks if the resultant hash matches. A sample run is here:

SQL> @sc_apx_pass.sql

CHK[3.1]: Apex Password Cracker
DBG: Schema=[APEX_220200]
DBG: lv_user_id =[3800883939144175]
DBG: lv_security_group=[10]
DBG: lv_user_name =[ADMIN]
DBG: lv_web_password2
=[44A592AEEFFE5DCF40239F21D77838EDABC26EF81F6D558018FA4CD13B1AF45D94911E5BBBB4BD
5734CE2B966FDFBA5802DD819EF12AD3B71411FF98772FF4F9]
ISSUE|CHK[3.1]: password for user [ADMIN] cracked - [oracle]
DBG: lv_user_id =[7407615931466835]
DBG: lv_security_group=[100001]
DBG: lv_user_name =[CUSTADMIN]
DBG: lv_web_password2
=[1894A011E2E1F02902A55551191C7058015C85A63F00D683D236367CDFF50F326EE6981B2B8E46
3068DABCEBC8D1CD67E3B115F1A3DC6626ECEEC7C0E3979E72]

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

The admin password was cracked but the CUSTADMIN was not. We use a small dictionary as a simple initial check and its slow.

Make sure that you set the APEX password profile settings as this will prevent a simple cracker like this finding a password.

#oracleace #sym_42 #oracle #apex #security #password #cracking

Apex Dictionary Views and their Security Mechanism

My main focuses are 1) securing data in Oracle databases; either through performing security audits or helping people design and implement anything Oracle security related such as Database Vault or designing audit trails or VPD or encryption or... and 2) securing code in the database - PL/SQL - this is by doing PL/SQL code audits or securing PL/SQL or helping design security into PL/SQL or with PL/SQL.

Where these two goals meet is with APEX where I also get involved in helping secure environments and also applications. One part of this is APEX instance wide parameters and I am particular interested in the security parameters. There is a table and view that its based on that hold the parameters:

SQL> col owner for a30
SQL> col object_name for a30
SQL> col object_type for a30
SQL> set lines 220
SQL> l
1* select owner,object_name,object_type from dba_objects where object_name in ('APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS','WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS')
SQL> /

OWNER OBJECT_NAME OBJECT_TYPE
------------------------------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------
PUBLIC APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS SYNONYM
APEX_220200 WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS TABLE
APEX_220200 APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS VIEW

SQL>

My user used to do the audit has these permissions:

find_all_privs: Release 1.0.7.0.0 - Production on Sun Dec 17 20:13:22 2023
Copyright (c) 2004 PeteFinnigan.com Limited. All rights reserved.

NAME OF USER TO CHECK [ORCL]: SCANNER
OUTPUT METHOD Screen/File [S]:
FILE NAME FOR OUTPUT [priv.lst]:
OUTPUT DIRECTORY [DIRECTORY or file (/tmp)]:

User => SCANNER has been granted the following privileges
====================================================================
SYS PRIV => CREATE SESSION grantable => NO
SYS PRIV => SELECT ANY DICTIONARY grantable => NO
TABLE PRIV => SELECT object => SYS.USER$ grantable => NO

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

For updates please visit http://www.petefinnigan.com/tools.htm

SQL>

I have limited rights and I cannot access WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS without additional permissions such as SELECT ANY TABLE but I can access APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS. Think at a high level of the APEX_% views like DBA_% and the WWV_FLOW_% as the XXX$ tables. We cannot look at WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS:

SQL> col name for a30
SQL> col value for a30
SQL> select name,value from apex_220200.wwv_flow_platform_prefs;
select name,value from apex_220200.wwv_flow_platform_prefs
*
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist


SQL>

But we can see the parameters in APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS:

SQL> col name for a60
SQL> col value for a100
SQL> set lines 220
SQL> set pages 0
SQL> select name,value from apex_instance_parameters order by name;
ACCOUNT_LIFETIME_DAYS 9999
ALLOW_DB_MONITOR N
ALLOW_LEGACY_THEME_COPY N
ALLOW_PERSISTENT_AUTHENTICATION N
ALLOW_PUBLIC_FILE_UPLOAD N
ALLOW_RAS N
APEX_BUILDER_AUTHENTICATION APEX
APEX_LISTENER_FOP_PATH _/fop2pdf
APPLICATION_ACTIVITY_LOGGING U
APP_EXPORT_TO_DB_ENABLED Y
AUDIT_LOG_RETENTION 90
AUTOEXTEND_TABLESPACES Y
AUTO_SCHEMA_NAME N
AUTO_WORKSPACE_NAME N
BIGFILE_TABLESPACES_ENABLED N
CHECK_FOR_UPDATES Y
CLONE_SESSION_ENABLED Y
CONTENT_CACHE_MAX_FILE_SIZE 1048576
CONTENT_CACHE_SIZE_TARGET 104857600
DEBUG_MESSAGE_PAGE_VIEW_LIMIT 50000
DEFAULT_THEMES 42,51
DELETE_UPLOADED_FILES_AFTER_DAYS 14
DG_ALLOW_FORMULAS Y
DG_ALLOW_JSON_DATA_SOURCES Y
DG_ALLOW_MULTI_VALUE Y
DG_ALLOW_SQL_DATA_SOURCES Y
DG_ALLOW_TABLE_DATA_SOURCES Y
DG_ALLOW_TABLE_DATA_SOURCE_WHERE_CLAUSE Y
DG_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_JSON_ROWS_TO_LOAD_PER_BUILTIN 500000
DG_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_ROWS_TO_RETRIEVE_FROM_REST_DATA_SOURCE 500000
DG_MAXIMUM_ROWS_PER_TABLE 500000
DG_PRIORITIZE_SPEED_OVER_RANDOMNESS Y
DG_USE_POWERSET_IF_AVAILABLE Y
DISABLE_ADMIN_LOGIN N
DISABLE_WORKSPACE_LOGIN N
DISABLE_WS_PROV N
ENABLE_TRANSACTIONAL_SQL N
ENCRYPTED_TABLESPACES_ENABLED N
EXPIRE_FND_USER_ACCOUNTS Y
GALLERY_FILE_URLS https://apex.oracle.com/manifests/v1/#APEX_BASE_VERSION#/manifest.json
GET_STARTED_URL https://apex.oracle.com/go/get_started_apex
HPROF_DIRECTORY -
IGNORED_FRIENDLY_URL_PARAMETERS utm_campaign,utm_source,utm_medium,utm_term,utm_content,fbclid
IMAGE_PREFIX /i/
INSTANCE_HASH B14959B75AC2F04B0E067DCCC70E88D833E1A39C609AEC3F34E13C6D619A6D6A
INSTANCE_ID 2400181437117375
KEEP_SESSIONS_ON_UPGRADE N
KILL_SESSIONS_LAST_CALL_ET 3600
KILL_SESSIONS_WAIT_TIME_SEC 120
LOGIN_THROTTLE_DELAY 5
LOGIN_THROTTLE_METHODS USERNAME_IP
MAX_APPLICATION_BACKUPS 25
MAX_DATA_EXPORT_IMAGES 1000
MAX_LOGIN_FAILURES 4
MAX_SCRIPT_SIZE 500000
MAX_SESSION_IDLE_SEC 3600
MAX_SESSION_LENGTH_SEC 28800
MAX_WEBSERVICE_REQUESTS 1000
MLE_LANGUAGES JAVASCRIPT
PASSWORD_ALPHA_CHARACTERS abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
PASSWORD_HISTORY_DAYS 0
PASSWORD_NOT_LIKE_WORDS oracle
PASSWORD_PUNCTUATION_CHARACTERS !"`'#$%&()[]{},.*+-/|\:;<=>?_~
PERSISTENT_AUTHENTICATION_MAX_DAYS 30
PLSQL_EDITING Y
PRINT_BIB_LICENSED NONE
REJOIN_EXISTING_SESSIONS P
REQUIRE_HTTPS N
REQ_NEW_SCHEMA N
RESTFUL_SERVICES_ENABLED Y
SELF_SERVICE_SCHEMA_PREFIX WKSP_
SERVICE_REQUESTS_ENABLED Y
SERVICE_REQUEST_FLOW MANUAL
SMTP_HOST_ADDRESS localhost
SMTP_HOST_PORT 25
SMTP_TLS_MODE N
SQL_SCRIPT_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE 200000
STATS_LAST_SENT 20231215
STRONG_SITE_ADMIN_PASSWORD N
SYSTEM_HELP_URL https://apex.oracle.com/doc222
TASK_RETENTION_PERIOD_DAYS 7
TOP_THEMES 42,51
TRACING_ENABLED Y
UPGRADE_DEFERRED N
UPGRADE_DEFER_DAYS 45
UPGRADE_DEFER_DAYS_MAX 90
USERNAME_VALIDATION *
WEBSERVICE_LOGGING U
WORKSPACE_EMAIL_MAXIMUM 1000
WORKSPACE_ISSUE_FILES_YN Y
WORKSPACE_ISSUE_FS_LIMIT 15728640
WORKSPACE_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE 2000000
WORKSPACE_PROVISION_DEMO_OBJECTS N
WORKSPACE_TEAM_DEV_FILES_YN N
WORKSPACE_TEAM_DEV_FS_LIMIT 15728640
WS_REQUEST_USAGE_Q N
ZIP_FILE_MAX_EXPANSION_FACTOR 200

97 rows selected.

SQL>

What are the permissions granted to APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS?

SQL> @sc_who_can_access
Enter value for owner_to_find: APEX_220200
Enter value for object_to_find: APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS
Checking object => APEX_220200.APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS
====================================================================


Object type is => VIEW (TAB)
Privilege => READ is granted to =>
Role => PUBLIC (ADM = NO)

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

This is easy, READ is granted to PUBLIC. What about the access to WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS:

SQL> @sc_who_can_access
Enter value for output_method: S
Enter value for owner_to_find: APEX_220200
Enter value for object_to_find: WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS
Checking object => APEX_220200.WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS
====================================================================



PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

There is no access to WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS by default. The APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS also has some limited security built in:

SQL> @sc_print 'select * from dba_views where view_name=''''APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS'''''
Executing Query [select * from dba_views where view_name='APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS']
OWNER : APEX_220200
VIEW_NAME : APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS
TEXT_LENGTH : 292
TEXT : select name,
case
when name in ('WALLET_PWD','SMTP_PASSWORD') and value is not null then '***'
else value
end,
created_on,
last_updated_on
from
wwv_flow_platform_prefs,
wwv_flow_current_sgid sgid
where sgid.has_apex_admin_read_role_yn = 'Y'
TEXT_VC : select name,
case
when name in ('WALLET_PWD','SMTP_PASSWORD') and value is not null then '***'
else value
end,
created_on,
last_updated_on
from
wwv_flow_platform_prefs,
wwv_flow_current_sgid sgid
where sgid.has_apex_admin_read_role_yn = 'Y'
TYPE_TEXT_LENGTH :
TYPE_TEXT :
OID_TEXT_LENGTH :
OID_TEXT :
VIEW_TYPE_OWNER :
VIEW_TYPE :
SUPERVIEW_NAME :
EDITIONING_VIEW : N
READ_ONLY : N
CONTAINER_DATA : N
BEQUEATH : DEFINER
ORIGIN_CON_ID : 3
DEFAULT_COLLATION : USING_NLS_COMP
CONTAINERS_DEFAULT : NO
CONTAINER_MAP : NO
EXTENDED_DATA_LINK : NO
EXTENDED_DATA_LINK_MAP : NO
HAS_SENSITIVE_COLUMN : NO
ADMIT_NULL : NO
PDB_LOCAL_ONLY : NO
DUALITY_VIEW : NO
-------------------------------------------

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

What is this role mentioned in the where clause?

SQL> select role from dba_roles where role like 'APEX%';
APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE
APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE
APEX_GRANTS_FOR_NEW_USERS_ROLE

3 rows selected.

SQL>

And lets see the view/table that is used in the where clause of APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS:

SQL> @sc_print 'select * from dba_views where view_name=''''WWV_FLOW_CURRENT_SGID'''''
Executing Query [select * from dba_views where view_name='WWV_FLOW_CURRENT_SGID']
OWNER : APEX_220200
VIEW_NAME : WWV_FLOW_CURRENT_SGID
TEXT_LENGTH : 412
TEXT : select nullif(wwv_flow.get_sgid,0) security_group_id,
cu,
nls_sort,
(select wwv_flow_security.has_apex_admin_read_role_yn(cu) from sys.dual)
has_apex_admin_read_role_yn
from ( select /*+ no_merge cardinality(t 1) */
sys_context('userenv','current_user') cu,
sys_context('userenv','nls_sort') nls_sort
from
sys.dual t ) d
TEXT_VC : select nullif(wwv_flow.get_sgid,0) security_group_id,
cu,
nls_sort,
(select wwv_flow_security.has_apex_admin_read_role_yn(cu) from sys.dual)
has_apex_admin_read_role_yn
from ( select /*+ no_merge cardinality(t 1) */
sys_context('userenv','current_user') cu,
sys_context('userenv','nls_sort') nls_sort
from
sys.dual t ) d
TYPE_TEXT_LENGTH :
TYPE_TEXT :
OID_TEXT_LENGTH :
OID_TEXT :
VIEW_TYPE_OWNER :
VIEW_TYPE :
SUPERVIEW_NAME :
EDITIONING_VIEW : N
READ_ONLY : N
CONTAINER_DATA : N
BEQUEATH : DEFINER
ORIGIN_CON_ID : 3
DEFAULT_COLLATION : USING_NLS_COMP
CONTAINERS_DEFAULT : NO
CONTAINER_MAP : NO
EXTENDED_DATA_LINK : NO
EXTENDED_DATA_LINK_MAP : NO
HAS_SENSITIVE_COLUMN : NO
ADMIT_NULL : NO
PDB_LOCAL_ONLY : NO
DUALITY_VIEW : NO
-------------------------------------------

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

So, you can see that both the SGID view and the WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS are BEQUETH DEFINER which is the default for a view, so the SGID view runs the code as APEX_220200 as that is the owner of this view. Who has this read role:

SQL> @sc_who_has_role
Enter value for output_method: S
Enter value for role_to_find: APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE
Investigating Role => APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE (PWD = NO) which is granted to =>
====================================================================
User => SYS (ADM = YES)

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

So, APEX_220200 does not have this role, only SYS has it. Also the check for this role is in a cartesian join with WWV_FLOW_PLATFORM_PREFS. What does this role do in the context of this APEX_INSTANCE_PARAMETERS view?

If we connect as SCANNER who does not have the role and select from the view we get 97 rows. If we connect as SYS who does have the role and select from the view we get 97 rows but remember the view runs as APEX_220200 who does not have the role. If we grant the role to APEX_220200 and select again as SCANNER we get the same 97 rows.

What does this obvious security check do?

If we run the API used in the SGID view as SYS for a current user of SYS we get:

SQL> set serveroutput on
SQL> begin
2 dbms_output.put_line(apex_220200.wwv_flow_security.has_apex_admin_read_role_yn('SYS'));
3 end;
4 /
Y

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

And if we run it as current user SCANNER who does not have the role we get:

SQL> begin
2 dbms_output.put_line(apex_220200.wwv_flow_security.has_apex_admin_read_role_yn('SCANNER'));
3 end;
4 /
Y

PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SQL>

Also 'Y' is returned. Hmmmm. What does the source of this package say:

SQL> select text from dba_source where name ='WWV_FLOW_SECURITY';
...
TEXT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
--==============================================================================


-- return Y if p_username should be able to read APEX dictionary views for all
-- workspaces. The user is entitled to query all workspaces if
--
-- - user is wwv_flow.g_flow_schema_owner, SYS, SYSTEM
-- - user has been granted APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE
-- - user has been granted APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE
-- - user has been granted SELECT ANY DICTIONARY

TEXT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--==============================================================================


function has_apex_admin_read_role_yn (
p_username in varchar2 default null )
return varchar2;
--
--==============================================================================

...

OK, so now we are getting somewhere with the security check. The comment in the package says you can read this view IF:

  • The current user is the schema owner - in this example APEX_220200

  • The current user is SYS or SYSTEM

  • The current user has the APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE

  • The current user has the APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE

  • The current user has SELECT ANY DICTIONARY


So, in my example above SYS has APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE and SCANNER has SELECT ANY DICTIONARY. So lets create a new user TESTER with just CREATE SESSION:

SQL> sho user
USER is "SYS"
SQL> grant create session to tester identified by tester;

Grant succeeded.

SQL>

Connect to TESTER and try the view:

SQL> connect tester/tester@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1
Connected.
SQL> select name,value from apex_instance_parameters;

no rows selected

SQL>

So, it works, of course!

This view is PUBLIC and can be accessed by the schema, SYS, SYSTEM, grantees of APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE and APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE and if the user has SELECT ANY DICTIONARY.

A simple security mechanism to allow a PUBLIC view and then limited access except to users controlled by roles, privileges or a specific set of users. I have been teaching and advising similar methods for your own code for many many years as its simple to do in a limited way and can be done in Standard Editions where extra tools are not available.

Oracle could have used VPD or Database Vault but this is a simple mechanism based on the APEX dictionary views and code. Can it be "got around?" - of course, but any mechanism can be abused with enough effort and other rights. This is why DV or VPD would be better as they are closer to the Oracle command kernel.

If we connect to SYS and let TESTER have ALTER USER:

C:\> sqlplus sys/oracle@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1 as sysdba

SQL*Plus: Release 11.2.0.4.0 Production on Mon Dec 18 11:02:04 2023

Copyright (c) 1982, 2013, Oracle. All rights reserved.


Connected to:
Oracle Database 23c Free, Release 23.0.0.0.0 - Developer-Release

SQL> grant alter user to tester;

Grant succeeded.

SQL>

Connect to TESTER and abuse:

SQL> connect tester/tester@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1
Connected.
SQL> alter user scanner grant connect through tester;

User altered.

SQL> connect tester[scanner]/tester@//192.168.56.18:1521/freepdb1
Connected.
SQL> select count(*) from apex_instance_parameters;

COUNT(*)
----------
97

SQL>

This is not hacking as its not SQL Injection or abusing a flaw in code. Its taking advantage of a user with one privilege (ALTER USER) and using it to bypass security in another user (SCANNER and piggy backing on its SELECT ANY DICTIONARY).

The APEX dictionary view security is fine and simple but will never be 100% if someone has access to other rights. There are many other ways to get around this; I leave it to you to work out what other methods there could be

#oracleace #sym_42 #oracle #apex #security #hacking #database

Oracle Forensics - Missing User IDs

Over the years I have been asked to look at many databases to tell the customer how they were breached or hacked. This is part of forensic analysis and breach response. Quite often there is no audit trails in the databases being looked at and whilst there are some things we can do without audit trails such as analyse SQL statements in the SGA or in the library cache there are surprisingly few pieces of data that we can use to analyse what might have happened.

The idea of missing ID's can be useful to look for missing data or when data might have been removed. We will use the idea of a user for this analysis but it could be other data as well not just users. There are a few scenarios for our example of a user being manipulated and how we may detect this when there is no auditing around this:

  • Hacker adds a user and its still there : We can check dates and see if the user is created after start of the breach so could be the work of the attacker

  • Hacker adds a user and removed it : There will be no create date for the user as it has been removed. There is no GAP in IDs as it was the last user created. We can check what the next user ID is and if there is still a gap based on this number we can assume a user was added and removed but we don't know when

  • The hacker uses an existing user : Again the create date is not useful as the hacker didn't create the user, it existed already. BUT, it could be locked or expired or password changed during the attack phase.

  • The hacker uses an existing user and removed it : The dates above are not there as the user was removed


We could use block analysis or redo logs or archive logs to confirm our assumptions. Because manipulation of users is recorded in the redo/archive logs then we can see this and get exact dates/times. If all else fails we could open the system data file in a hex editor and locate the records for user changes and removed users and see the dates at least for create, lock, expire or password changes but no transaction dates.

Lets test adding a user to the database and see the dates afterwards. First look at the existing user records:

SQL> col user_id for 9999999999999
SQL> col username for a30
SQL> col lock_date for a20
SQL> col expiry_date for a20
SQL> col password_change_date for a20
SQL> set lines 220
SQL> select user_id,username,to_char(created,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),to_char(lock_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),to_char(expiry_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),to_char(password_change_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS') from dba_users order by created;

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
0 SYS 26-MAR-2023:02:26:54
8 AUDSYS 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
9 SYSTEM 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
2147483620 SYSRAC 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
2147483617 SYSBACKUP 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483619 SYSKM 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483618 SYSDG 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
13 OUTLN 26-MAR-2023:02:27:05 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
25 GSMUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
24 GSMADMIN_INTERNAL 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
26 DIP 26-MAR-2023:03:12:06 26-MAR-2023:03:12:06

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
2147483638 XS$NULL 26-MAR-2023:03:12:31 26-MAR-2023:03:12:31
40 REMOTE_SCHEDULER_AGENT 26-MAR-2023:03:12:38 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
41 DBSFWUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:12:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
53 GGSHAREDCAP 26-MAR-2023:03:15:43 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
55 SYS$UMF 26-MAR-2023:03:27:03 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
62 DGPDB_INT 26-MAR-2023:03:29:06 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
75 DBSNMP 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
76 APPQOSSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
82 GSMCATUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:33:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
83 GGSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:34:04 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
86 ANONYMOUS 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
85 XDB 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
95 WMSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:48:27 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
104 OJVMSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:50:24 07-APR-2023:14:53:16
106 CTXSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:53:39 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
109 OLAPSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:55:37 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
112 MDSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:00:40 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
113 MDDATA 26-MAR-2023:04:00:40 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
127 LBACSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:05:33 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
1279990 DVSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:06:30 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
129 DVF 26-MAR-2023:04:06:30 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
130 PDBADMIN 03-APR-2023:16:50:15 03-APR-2023:16:50:15

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
133 APEX_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:17:00:25
131 APEX_220200 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:16:53:17
132 FLOWS_FILES 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:16:53:17
137 APEX_LISTENER 03-APR-2023:17:00:24 03-APR-2023:17:00:24
138 APEX_REST_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:17:00:24 03-APR-2023:17:00:24
139 ORDS_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:17:00:39 03-APR-2023:17:00:39
140 ORDS_METADATA 03-APR-2023:17:00:40
143 HRREST 03-APR-2023:17:01:12 03-APR-2023:17:01:12
144 HR 03-APR-2023:17:01:14 03-APR-2023:17:01:14
145 OE 03-APR-2023:17:01:19 03-APR-2023:17:01:19
146 PM 03-APR-2023:17:01:56 03-APR-2023:17:01:56

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
147 IX 03-APR-2023:17:02:02 03-APR-2023:17:02:02
148 SH 03-APR-2023:17:02:09 03-APR-2023:17:02:09
149 BI 03-APR-2023:17:02:48 03-APR-2023:17:02:48
150 AV 03-APR-2023:17:02:53 03-APR-2023:17:02:53
151 PFCLSCAN 05-APR-2023:13:05:50 21-APR-2023:12:52:44
152 VA 06-APR-2023:15:20:00 26-MAY-2023:11:46:46
153 VB 06-APR-2023:15:21:44 06-APR-2023:15:21:44
154 VC 06-APR-2023:15:26:36 06-APR-2023:15:26:36
157 VF 10-APR-2023:11:11:31 10-APR-2023:11:11:31
158 VG 10-APR-2023:12:06:57 10-APR-2023:12:06:57
159 VE 14-APR-2023:13:21:53 14-APR-2023:13:21:53

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
160 VJ 02-MAY-2023:12:51:56 02-MAY-2023:12:51:56
165 VV 26-JUN-2023:08:52:17 26-JUN-2023:08:52:17
166 VX 26-JUN-2023:09:55:57 26-JUN-2023:09:55:57
167 SCHEMA1 26-JUN-2023:14:18:49 26-JUN-2023:14:18:49
168 SCHEMA2 26-JUN-2023:14:19:32 26-JUN-2023:14:19:32
169 CON1 26-JUN-2023:14:27:16 26-JUN-2023:14:27:16
170 CON2 26-JUN-2023:14:28:23 26-JUN-2023:14:28:23
171 TESTTEST 14-JUL-2023:08:56:43 14-JUL-2023:08:56:43
172 TT1 09-OCT-2023:09:15:27 09-OCT-2023:09:15:27
173 UU1 09-OCT-2023:09:16:49 09-OCT-2023:09:16:49
174 TEST33 03-NOV-2023:14:30:26 03-NOV-2023:14:30:26

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
187 ORABLOG 16-NOV-2023:15:09:30 16-NOV-2023:15:09:30
188 VM 16-NOV-2023:15:09:53 16-NOV-2023:15:09:53
189 SQL_F 16-NOV-2023:15:10:39 16-NOV-2023:15:10:39
190 VQ 16-NOV-2023:15:29:46 16-NOV-2023:15:29:46
191 SCANNER 29-NOV-2023:12:43:36 29-NOV-2023:12:43:36
192 PROXY 29-NOV-2023:14:21:46 29-NOV-2023:14:21:46

72 rows selected.

SQL>

As we can see already there are issues that make analysis hard. The first is that the list is ordered by created date and not ID we whilst user IDs for user created users and most others are 3 digits there are some users that have large USER_IDS such as 2147483620 for SYSRAC and others in a different sequence such as 1279990 for DVSYS.

Also by using CEATED as the order by some IDs are out of order such as 85 and 86 which have the same date. If we change the ORDER BY to include the USER_ID:

SQL> select user_id,username,to_char(created,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),to_char(lock_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),to_char(expiry_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),to_char(password_change_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS') from dba_users order by created,user_id;

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
0 SYS 26-MAR-2023:02:26:54
8 AUDSYS 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
9 SYSTEM 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
2147483617 SYSBACKUP 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483618 SYSDG 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483619 SYSKM 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483620 SYSRAC 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
13 OUTLN 26-MAR-2023:02:27:05 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
24 GSMADMIN_INTERNAL 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
25 GSMUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
26 DIP 26-MAR-2023:03:12:06 26-MAR-2023:03:12:06

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
2147483638 XS$NULL 26-MAR-2023:03:12:31 26-MAR-2023:03:12:31
40 REMOTE_SCHEDULER_AGENT 26-MAR-2023:03:12:38 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
41 DBSFWUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:12:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
53 GGSHAREDCAP 26-MAR-2023:03:15:43 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
55 SYS$UMF 26-MAR-2023:03:27:03 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
62 DGPDB_INT 26-MAR-2023:03:29:06 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
75 DBSNMP 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
76 APPQOSSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
82 GSMCATUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:33:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
83 GGSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:34:04 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
85 XDB 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
86 ANONYMOUS 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
95 WMSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:48:27 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
104 OJVMSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:50:24 07-APR-2023:14:53:16
106 CTXSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:53:39 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
109 OLAPSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:55:37 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
112 MDSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:00:40 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
113 MDDATA 26-MAR-2023:04:00:40 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
127 LBACSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:05:33 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
129 DVF 26-MAR-2023:04:06:30 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
1279990 DVSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:06:30 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
130 PDBADMIN 03-APR-2023:16:50:15 03-APR-2023:16:50:15

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
131 APEX_220200 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:16:53:17
132 FLOWS_FILES 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:16:53:17
133 APEX_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:17:00:25
137 APEX_LISTENER 03-APR-2023:17:00:24 03-APR-2023:17:00:24
138 APEX_REST_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:17:00:24 03-APR-2023:17:00:24
139 ORDS_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:17:00:39 03-APR-2023:17:00:39
140 ORDS_METADATA 03-APR-2023:17:00:40
143 HRREST 03-APR-2023:17:01:12 03-APR-2023:17:01:12
144 HR 03-APR-2023:17:01:14 03-APR-2023:17:01:14
145 OE 03-APR-2023:17:01:19 03-APR-2023:17:01:19
146 PM 03-APR-2023:17:01:56 03-APR-2023:17:01:56

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
147 IX 03-APR-2023:17:02:02 03-APR-2023:17:02:02
148 SH 03-APR-2023:17:02:09 03-APR-2023:17:02:09
149 BI 03-APR-2023:17:02:48 03-APR-2023:17:02:48
150 AV 03-APR-2023:17:02:53 03-APR-2023:17:02:53
151 PFCLSCAN 05-APR-2023:13:05:50 21-APR-2023:12:52:44
152 VA 06-APR-2023:15:20:00 26-MAY-2023:11:46:46
153 VB 06-APR-2023:15:21:44 06-APR-2023:15:21:44
154 VC 06-APR-2023:15:26:36 06-APR-2023:15:26:36
157 VF 10-APR-2023:11:11:31 10-APR-2023:11:11:31
158 VG 10-APR-2023:12:06:57 10-APR-2023:12:06:57
159 VE 14-APR-2023:13:21:53 14-APR-2023:13:21:53

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
160 VJ 02-MAY-2023:12:51:56 02-MAY-2023:12:51:56
165 VV 26-JUN-2023:08:52:17 26-JUN-2023:08:52:17
166 VX 26-JUN-2023:09:55:57 26-JUN-2023:09:55:57
167 SCHEMA1 26-JUN-2023:14:18:49 26-JUN-2023:14:18:49
168 SCHEMA2 26-JUN-2023:14:19:32 26-JUN-2023:14:19:32
169 CON1 26-JUN-2023:14:27:16 26-JUN-2023:14:27:16
170 CON2 26-JUN-2023:14:28:23 26-JUN-2023:14:28:23
171 TESTTEST 14-JUL-2023:08:56:43 14-JUL-2023:08:56:43
172 TT1 09-OCT-2023:09:15:27 09-OCT-2023:09:15:27
173 UU1 09-OCT-2023:09:16:49 09-OCT-2023:09:16:49
174 TEST33 03-NOV-2023:14:30:26 03-NOV-2023:14:30:26

USER_ID USERNAME TO_CHAR(CREATED,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(LOCK_DATE,'DD-MON-YYY TO_CHAR(EXPIRY_DATE,'DD-MON-Y TO_CHAR(PASSWORD_CHANGE_DATE,
-------------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
187 ORABLOG 16-NOV-2023:15:09:30 16-NOV-2023:15:09:30
188 VM 16-NOV-2023:15:09:53 16-NOV-2023:15:09:53
189 SQL_F 16-NOV-2023:15:10:39 16-NOV-2023:15:10:39
190 VQ 16-NOV-2023:15:29:46 16-NOV-2023:15:29:46
191 SCANNER 29-NOV-2023:12:43:36 29-NOV-2023:12:43:36
192 PROXY 29-NOV-2023:14:21:46 29-NOV-2023:14:21:46

72 rows selected.

SQL>

This fixes the issue of USER_ID 85 and 86. The other thing that stands out is the big gaps in USER_IDs such as SYS = 0 and SYSTEM = 9. This is because ROLES also get a USER_ID as both are stored in SYS.USER$. Lets get the details instead from USER$. First here is a simple script:

SQL> get for_user
1 -- user analysis
2 --col user_id for 9999999999999
3 --col username for a30
4 --col lock_date for a20
5 --col expiry_date for a20
6 --col password_change_date for a20
7 --set lines 220
8 --
9 --select user_id,
10 -- username,
11 -- to_char(created,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),
12 -- to_char(lock_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),
13 -- to_char(expiry_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),
14 -- to_char(password_change_date,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS')
15 --from dba_users order by created,user_id
16 --/
17 col user# for 9999999999999
18 col name for a32
19 col ctime for a20
20 col ltime for a20
21 col exptime for a20
22 col ptime for a20
23 col type# for a4
24 select user#,
25 decode(type#,0,'ROLE',1,'USER','UNKN'),
26 name,
27 to_char(ctime,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),
28 to_char(ltime,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),
29 to_char(exptime,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS'),
30 to_char(ptime,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH24:MI:SS')
31 from sys.user$
32* order by ctime,user#
33 .
SQL>

Now run it and see the results:

SQL> @for_user

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
0 USER SYS 26-MAR-2023:02:26:54
1 ROLE PUBLIC 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
2 ROLE CONNECT 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
3 ROLE RESOURCE 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
4 ROLE DBA 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
5 ROLE PDB_DBA 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
6 ROLE AUDIT_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
7 ROLE AUDIT_VIEWER 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
8 USER AUDSYS 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
193 ROLE _NEXT_USER 26-MAR-2023:02:26:55
9 USER SYSTEM 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
10 ROLE SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
11 ROLE EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
12 ROLE CAPTURE_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
2147483617 USER SYSBACKUP 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483618 USER SYSDG 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483619 USER SYSKM 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
2147483620 USER SYSRAC 26-MAR-2023:02:26:56
13 USER OUTLN 26-MAR-2023:02:27:05 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
14 ROLE EXP_FULL_DATABASE 26-MAR-2023:02:27:30
15 ROLE IMP_FULL_DATABASE 26-MAR-2023:02:27:30
16 ROLE AVTUNE_PKG_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:02:27:46

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
17 ROLE CDB_DBA 26-MAR-2023:03:10:41
18 ROLE APPLICATION_TRACE_VIEWER 26-MAR-2023:03:11:00
19 ROLE ACCHK_READ 26-MAR-2023:03:11:00
20 ROLE LOGSTDBY_ADMINISTRATOR 26-MAR-2023:03:11:48
21 ROLE DBFS_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:11:55
22 ROLE GSMUSER_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57
23 ROLE GSMROOTUSER_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57
24 USER GSMADMIN_INTERNAL 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
25 USER GSMUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:11:57 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
26 USER DIP 26-MAR-2023:03:12:06 26-MAR-2023:03:12:06
27 ROLE SAGA_ADM_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:11

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
28 ROLE SAGA_PARTICIPANT_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:11
29 ROLE SAGA_CONNECT_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:11
30 ROLE AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:13
31 ROLE AQ_USER_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:13
32 ROLE DATAPUMP_EXP_FULL_DATABASE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:16
33 ROLE DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:16
34 ROLE ADM_PARALLEL_EXECUTE_TASK 26-MAR-2023:03:12:28
35 ROLE PROVISIONER 26-MAR-2023:03:12:30
36 ROLE XS_SESSION_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:12:30
37 ROLE XS_NAMESPACE_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:12:30
38 ROLE XS_CACHE_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:12:30

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
39 ROLE XS_CONNECT 26-MAR-2023:03:12:30
2147483638 USER XS$NULL 26-MAR-2023:03:12:31 26-MAR-2023:03:12:31
40 USER REMOTE_SCHEDULER_AGENT 26-MAR-2023:03:12:38 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
41 USER DBSFWUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:12:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
42 ROLE SQL_FIREWALL_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:12:48
43 ROLE SQL_FIREWALL_VIEWER 26-MAR-2023:03:12:48
44 ROLE OSAK_ADMIN_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:12:49
45 ROLE GATHER_SYSTEM_STATISTICS 26-MAR-2023:03:13:49
46 ROLE OPTIMIZER_PROCESSING_RATE 26-MAR-2023:03:13:49
47 ROLE DBMS_MDX_INTERNAL 26-MAR-2023:03:14:00
48 ROLE BDSQL_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:14:35

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
49 ROLE BDSQL_USER 26-MAR-2023:03:14:35
50 ROLE RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER 26-MAR-2023:03:14:56
51 ROLE RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER_VPD 26-MAR-2023:03:14:56
52 ROLE RECOVERY_CATALOG_USER 26-MAR-2023:03:14:56
53 USER GGSHAREDCAP 26-MAR-2023:03:15:43 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
54 ROLE SYSUMF_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:27:03
55 USER SYS$UMF 26-MAR-2023:03:27:03 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
56 ROLE MAINTPLAN_APP 26-MAR-2023:03:27:04
57 ROLE NOTIFICATIONS_USER 26-MAR-2023:03:27:06
58 ROLE NOTIFICATIONS_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:27:06
59 ROLE SCHEDULER_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:28:51

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
60 ROLE PPLB_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:29:06
61 ROLE DGPDB_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:29:06
62 USER DGPDB_INT 26-MAR-2023:03:29:06 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
63 ROLE HS_ADMIN_SELECT_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:29:25
64 ROLE HS_ADMIN_EXECUTE_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:29:25
65 ROLE HS_ADMIN_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:29:25
66 ROLE GLOBAL_AQ_USER_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:29:28
67 ROLE OGG_CAPTURE 26-MAR-2023:03:33:51
68 ROLE OGG_APPLY 26-MAR-2023:03:33:51
69 ROLE OGG_APPLY_PROCREP 26-MAR-2023:03:33:51
70 ROLE OGG_SHARED_CAPTURE 26-MAR-2023:03:33:51

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
71 ROLE XSTREAM_CAPTURE 26-MAR-2023:03:33:51
72 ROLE XSTREAM_APPLY 26-MAR-2023:03:33:51
73 ROLE OEM_ADVISOR 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52
74 ROLE OEM_MONITOR 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52
75 USER DBSNMP 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
76 USER APPQOSSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:33:52 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
77 ROLE GSMCATUSER_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:33:54
78 ROLE GSMADMIN_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:33:54
79 ROLE GSM_POOLADMIN_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:33:54
80 ROLE GDS_CATALOG_SELECT 26-MAR-2023:03:33:54
81 ROLE SHARDED_SCHEMA_OWNER 26-MAR-2023:03:33:54

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
82 USER GSMCATUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:33:56 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
83 USER GGSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:34:04 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
84 ROLE GGSYS_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:34:04
85 USER XDB 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
86 USER ANONYMOUS 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
87 ROLE XDBADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:35:41
88 ROLE XDB_SET_INVOKER 26-MAR-2023:03:35:59
89 ROLE AUTHENTICATEDUSER 26-MAR-2023:03:36:01
90 ROLE XDB_WEBSERVICES 26-MAR-2023:03:36:01
91 ROLE XDB_WEBSERVICES_WITH_PUBLIC 26-MAR-2023:03:36:01
92 ROLE XDB_WEBSERVICES_OVER_HTTP 26-MAR-2023:03:36:01

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
93 ROLE SODA_APP 26-MAR-2023:03:46:36
94 ROLE DB_DEVELOPER_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:46:50
95 USER WMSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:48:27 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
96 ROLE WM_ADMIN_ROLE 26-MAR-2023:03:48:33
97 ROLE JAVAUSERPRIV 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20
98 ROLE JAVAIDPRIV 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20
99 ROLE JAVASYSPRIV 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20
100 ROLE JAVADEBUGPRIV 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20
101 ROLE EJBCLIENT 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20
102 ROLE JMXSERVER 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20
103 ROLE DBJAVASCRIPT 26-MAR-2023:03:50:20

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
104 USER OJVMSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:50:24 07-APR-2023:14:53:16
105 ROLE JAVA_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:50:44
106 USER CTXSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:53:39 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
107 ROLE CTXAPP 26-MAR-2023:03:53:40
108 ROLE OLAP_XS_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:03:55:31
109 USER OLAPSYS 26-MAR-2023:03:55:37 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
110 ROLE OLAP_DBA 26-MAR-2023:03:55:38
111 ROLE OLAP_USER 26-MAR-2023:03:55:38
112 USER MDSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:00:40 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
113 USER MDDATA 26-MAR-2023:04:00:40 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
114 ROLE RDFCTX_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:04:04:29

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
115 ROLE GRAPH_DEVELOPER 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
116 ROLE GRAPH_ADMINISTRATOR 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
117 ROLE GRAPH_USER 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
118 ROLE PGX_SESSION_CREATE 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
119 ROLE PGX_SERVER_GET_INFO 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
120 ROLE PGX_SERVER_MANAGE 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
121 ROLE PGX_SESSION_READ_MODEL 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
122 ROLE PGX_SESSION_MODIFY_MODEL 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
123 ROLE PGX_SESSION_NEW_GRAPH 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
124 ROLE PGX_SESSION_GET_PUBLISHED_GRAPH 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
125 ROLE PGX_SESSION_COMPILE_ALGORITHM 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
126 ROLE PGX_SESSION_ADD_PUBLISHED_GRAPH 26-MAR-2023:04:04:38
127 USER LBACSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:05:33 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
128 ROLE LBAC_DBA 26-MAR-2023:04:05:33
129 USER DVF 26-MAR-2023:04:06:30 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
1279990 USER DVSYS 26-MAR-2023:04:06:30 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
1279991 ROLE DV_ACCTMGR 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
1279992 ROLE DV_OWNER 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
1279993 ROLE DV_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
1279994 ROLE DV_SECANALYST 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483627 ROLE DV_PATCH_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483628 ROLE DV_MONITOR 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
2147483629 ROLE DV_STREAMS_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483630 ROLE DV_GOLDENGATE_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483631 ROLE DV_XSTREAM_ADMIN 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483632 ROLE DV_GOLDENGATE_REDO_ACCESS 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483633 ROLE DV_AUDIT_CLEANUP 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483634 ROLE DV_DATAPUMP_NETWORK_LINK 26-MAR-2023:04:06:40
2147483635 ROLE DV_POLICY_OWNER 26-MAR-2023:04:06:41
130 USER PDBADMIN 03-APR-2023:16:50:15 30-SEP-2023:16:50:15 03-APR-2023:16:50:15
131 USER APEX_220200 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:16:53:17
132 USER FLOWS_FILES 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:16:53:17
133 USER APEX_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:16:53:17 03-APR-2023:17:00:25

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
134 ROLE APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_READ_ROLE 03-APR-2023:16:53:21
135 ROLE APEX_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE 03-APR-2023:16:53:21
136 ROLE APEX_GRANTS_FOR_NEW_USERS_ROLE 03-APR-2023:16:53:21
137 USER APEX_LISTENER 03-APR-2023:17:00:24 03-APR-2023:17:00:24
138 USER APEX_REST_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:17:00:24 03-APR-2023:17:00:24
139 USER ORDS_PUBLIC_USER 03-APR-2023:17:00:39 03-APR-2023:17:00:39
140 USER ORDS_METADATA 03-APR-2023:17:00:40
141 ROLE ORDS_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE 03-APR-2023:17:00:52
142 ROLE ORDS_RUNTIME_ROLE 03-APR-2023:17:00:52
143 USER HRREST 03-APR-2023:17:01:12 03-APR-2023:17:01:12
144 USER HR 03-APR-2023:17:01:14 03-APR-2023:17:01:14

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
145 USER OE 03-APR-2023:17:01:19 03-APR-2023:17:01:19
146 USER PM 03-APR-2023:17:01:56 03-APR-2023:17:01:56
147 USER IX 03-APR-2023:17:02:02 03-APR-2023:17:02:02
148 USER SH 03-APR-2023:17:02:09 03-APR-2023:17:02:09
149 USER BI 03-APR-2023:17:02:48 03-APR-2023:17:02:48
150 USER AV 03-APR-2023:17:02:53 03-APR-2023:17:02:53
151 USER PFCLSCAN 05-APR-2023:13:05:50 21-APR-2023:12:52:44
152 USER VA 06-APR-2023:15:20:00 26-MAY-2023:11:46:46
153 USER VB 06-APR-2023:15:21:44 06-APR-2023:15:21:44
154 USER VC 06-APR-2023:15:26:36 06-APR-2023:15:26:36
157 USER VF 10-APR-2023:11:11:31 10-APR-2023:11:11:31

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
158 USER VG 10-APR-2023:12:06:57 10-APR-2023:12:06:57
159 USER VE 14-APR-2023:13:21:53 14-APR-2023:13:21:53
160 USER VJ 02-MAY-2023:12:51:56 02-MAY-2023:12:51:56
165 USER VV 26-JUN-2023:08:52:17 26-JUN-2023:08:52:17
166 USER VX 26-JUN-2023:09:55:57 26-JUN-2023:09:55:57
167 USER SCHEMA1 26-JUN-2023:14:18:49 26-JUN-2023:14:18:49
168 USER SCHEMA2 26-JUN-2023:14:19:32 26-JUN-2023:14:19:32
169 USER CON1 26-JUN-2023:14:27:16 26-JUN-2023:14:27:16
170 USER CON2 26-JUN-2023:14:28:23 26-JUN-2023:14:28:23
171 USER TESTTEST 14-JUL-2023:08:56:43 14-JUL-2023:08:56:43
172 USER TT1 09-OCT-2023:09:15:27 09-OCT-2023:09:15:27

USER# DECO NAME TO_CHAR(CTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(LTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH TO_CHAR(EXPTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY: TO_CHAR(PTIME,'DD-MON-YYYY:HH
-------------- ---- -------------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------------
173 USER UU1 09-OCT-2023:09:16:49 09-OCT-2023:09:16:49
174 USER TEST33 03-NOV-2023:14:30:26 03-NOV-2023:14:30:26
187 USER ORABLOG 16-NOV-2023:15:09:30 16-NOV-2023:15:09:30
188 USER VM 16-NOV-2023:15:09:53 16-NOV-2023:15:09:53
189 USER SQL_F 16-NOV-2023:15:10:39 16-NOV-2023:15:10:39
190 USER VQ 16-NOV-2023:15:29:46 16-NOV-2023:15:29:46
191 USER SCANNER 29-NOV-2023:12:43:36 29-NOV-2023:12:43:36
192 USER PROXY 29-NOV-2023:14:21:46 29-NOV-2023:14:21:46

195 rows selected.

SQL>

There are a few things of interest:

  • Roles also use the bigger numbers in some cases for the series 2147483635 or 1279994

  • PUBLIC is shown as TYPE=0 and therefore in this script its shows as a ROLE but its a USER GROUP not a role.

  • The sequence _NEXT_USER has a ID value of 193 and is shown in this script as a ROLE but its a sequence and it shows the next normal USER ID to use

  • There are gaps visible. Lets use the example of the gap between IDs 154 to 157. User id 154 is user VC and the next user id is 157 for user VF. So it would appear two users are missing, ID 155 and ID 156, we can reasonably know the IDs but not the names. We know user VC was created on 06-APR-2023:15:26:36 and VF on 10-APR-2023:11:11:31 SO we can say for certain that users 155 and 156 were created between the 6th April and the 10th April BUT we do not know when they were removed. We can say for certain that they were removed after the CREATE date and before the current SYSDATE - a much bigger range of dates. We can see user IDs 152 and 153 have names VA and VB and the last user before the gap is VC and the next user is VF and the one after is VG (ID 158). So we can assume as a working hypothesis that the missing users are VD and VE. We can see VE exists as ID 159 so the assumption is VD and VE were deleted and VE was also re-created. This is good news to reduce the date range of when the users were deleted. Because user VE as User ID 159 was created on 10-APR-2023:12:06:57 then this narrows the window of when user IDs 155 and 156 were removed. If one of these users was VE then it could not be added if it existed so its likely now that it was deleted between the create date of User ID 154 and 159

  • Because the next user sequence is 193 and the last current user ID is 192 we can assume no users were removed after the creation date of user ID 192


The next step is to ascertain when the attack took place - or currently is assumed to have taken place. As more evidence is looked at we can narrow the dates of the attack to be more certain of what events took place during the attack dates and slowly narrow the date range.

We would need to look at more data, objects created, tables, views, PL/SQL and also grants made. Even if we have no audit trails we can still use gaps in data to help us investigate. Once we have a more detailed view of events that occurred during the attack we can start to use other data to try and correlate this; the SQL, redo, library cache, even external logs.

The biggest problem is that if an attack was purely reading data then no objects are created or dropped and if there is no audit trails it is much harder to find other data to corroborate an attack.

All is not lost if there are no audit trails BUT its harder to find evidence or prove something happened in the database but techniques such as these require work and detective work but can be fruitful.

#oracleace #sym_42 #oracle #database #security #forensics #liveresponse #databreach

Secure Password Store - Wallets

One of the key security issues I come across when performing security audits is the proliferation of passwords located on SQL files and OS shell scripts and more. If you get access to the server you can learn a lot of the database passwords and if you were an attacker use them. We see the same issues in binaries also where the password is hard coded into C code for instance.

Even if you pass in the password on the command line then often in a Unix/Linux environment the password is visible in process lists or is captured in OS history files.

There have been may solutions over the years including adding spaces to the process list to shove the passwords off to the right or clearing history files or adding passwords to hidden files or to environment variables.

The better solution if a password must be used in a program or script is to use a wallet and Oracles secure password store where credentials are stored in a wallet. This is simple to use and then the username and password is no longer visible when used as this is replaced by "/" - slash. On connecting to the database the OCI libraries (The original OCI not the Cloud) know that the method is OCI_CRED_EXT on OCISessionBegin() and know that the sqlnet.ora SQLNET.WALLET_OVERRIDE=TRUE means do and look for the credentials in the wallet referenced also in the sqlnet.ora. So, in this case the password is not seen in clear text and is retrieved from the wallet and passed to the OCI connection sequence of C functions.

So, to use this is simple. If you use a full client the tools are available but if you use an instant client then you can create the wallet on the server and copy to the PC or client Linux/Unix box.

First create the wallet on the server:

[root@localhost ~]# su - oracle
[oracle@localhost ~]$ pwd
/home/oracle
[oracle@localhost ~]$ mkdir client
[oracle@localhost ~]$ cd client
[oracle@localhost client]$ orapki wallet create -wallet . -auto_login
Oracle PKI Tool Release 23.2.0.0.0 - Production
Version 23.2.0.0.0
Copyright (c) 2004, 2023, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Enter password:
Enter password again:
Operation is successfully completed.
[oracle@localhost client]$


The wallet password is used only to manage the wallet not to open it. In this case we set -auto_login as we want the wallet to auto open on the PC BUT we cannot set it to -auto_login_local on the server as the wallet will then not auto open on the PC. This is a security issue itself as we want the wallet to auto-open BUT it means an attacker can copy the wallet to their own PC and then connect to the database without knowledge of the password. We have two options here; the first is to get the wallet tools on the client and use auto_login_local; the second is to not use auto_login at all BUT the user would need to pass the wallet password on database login to open it and then just passes the original problem to the next step; i.e. a password is needed. So, if you have to use instant clients and wallets then this is a security risk. You can also use other database features such as Database Vault or logon triggers to limit any connection from a wallet to known clients.

OK, so now as a database credential to the wallet

[oracle@localhost client]$ mkstore -wrl . -createCredential freepdb1 scanner scanner
Oracle Secret Store Tool Release 23.2.0.0.0 - Production
Version 23.2.0.0.0
Copyright (c) 2004, 2023, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

Enter wallet password:
[oracle@localhost client]$

As you can see the database credentials (username/password) are linked to the TNS entry so if you would like to connect to multiple database users then you can add multiple TNS entry linked credentials to the wallet. i.e. one per user and then add these to the TNS names and use each TNS for each user added.

Now we an ftp the server created wallet (secure password store) from the database server to the client PC. Then create the sqlnet.ora on the client and include:

WALLET_LOCATION=
(SOURCE=
(METHOD=file)
(METHOD_DATA=(DIRECTORY=C:\_aa\PB\bin)))
SQLNET.WALLET_OVERRIDE = TRUE
SSL_CLIENT_AUTHENTICATION=FALSE
SSL_VERSION = 0

In my file i point to my wallet location and also set SQLNET.WALLET_OVERRIDE=TRUE to say use the wallet for the password. The tnsnames.ora is just a standard entry as follows:

FREEPDB1=
(DESCRIPTION=
(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=TCP)(HOST=192.168.56.18)(PORT=1521))
(CONNECT_DATA=
(SERVICE_NAME=freepdb1)))

Remember if we want to connect to multiple credentials (users/password) in a wallet we need multiple TNS entries and multiple credentials in the wallet. So, now lets connect to the database using the wallet (secure password store)

C:\_aa\PD>sqlplus /nolog

SQL*Plus: Release 11.2.0.4.0 Production on Wed Nov 29 15:28:51 2023

Copyright (c) 1982, 2013, Oracle. All rights reserved.

SQL> connect /@freepdb1
Connected.
SQL>

As you can see I can connect to the database now without using a password directly on command line or in a script should I want to connect to the database in a script.

In Oracle 23c Oracle have deprecated the mkstore command. Oracle state that they will be enhancing the orapki tool after 23c to add the functionality in mkstore to it.

#oracleace #sym_42 #23c #wallet #oracle #secure #password #store #credentials